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 Judging the Judges: Judicial 
Independence and Reforms to the 
Supreme Court of Canada 
Appointment Process* 
The Honourable Michael J. Bryant** 
The most important constitutional issue facing Canadians today is 
the role of the judiciary in the state. The appointment of judges, their 
security of tenure, their administrative independence and other facets of 
institutional independence are all aspects of what is becoming the domi-
nant constitutional issue of our time. 
Twenty years ago we talked about what the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms would do. Ten years ago, we talked about where the remark-
able Charter jurisprudence would go and how far it would go. Today, 
more and more the public debate focuses on the judges themselves. 
Nothing could have a greater effect on constitutional law than changes 
to the independence of the judiciary. It is in this context that I offer my 
perspective on possible reform of the appointment process for judges of 
the Supreme Court of Canada, and how such reform could in turn affect 
how other federal and provincial court appointments are made. 
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
The Supreme Court itself has very well articulated what judicial in-
dependence is and why it is so important. In The Provincial Judges 
Reference,1 the Supreme Court recognized that the “constitutional 
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  Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
3, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75. 
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home” for judicial independence was not only the Charter or the Consti-
tution Act, 1867, but also the unwritten and organizing principles of the 
Constitution tracing as far back as the Act of Settlement, 1701. The 
Court noted that there were two goals inherent in judicial independence: 
 
• the maintenance of public confidence in the impartiality of the 
judiciary; and  
• the maintenance of the rule of law.2 
 
To further these goals, the Court held that there were limits to legislative 
sovereignty over judicial institutions.3 That is, the judiciary is independ-
ent from the other branches of government. 
Earlier, the Court had recognized two dimensions of judicial inde-
pendence: the individual independence of judges and the collective 
independence of the courts as an institution.4 Institutional independence 
arises from the position of the courts as “organs and protectors of the 
Constitution and the fundamental values embodied in it — rule of law, 
fundamental justice, equality, preservation of the democratic proc-
                                                                                                                                
2
  Id., at para. 10. 
3
  Id., at para. 108:  
It follows that the same constitutional imperative – the preservation of the basic 
structure – which led Beetz J. (In OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] 
S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2) to limit the power of legislatures to affect the 
operation of political institutions, also extends protection to the judicial institu-
tions of our constitutional system. 
See also the comments of Justice Le Dain in R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, at 685, 
[1985] S.C.J. No. 77: 
Without that confidence the system cannot command the respect and acceptance 
that are essential to its effective operation. It is, therefore, important that a tribu-
nal should be perceived as independent, as well as impartial, and that the test for 
independence should include that perception. 
4
  As stated in R. v. Valente, id., at 687: 
The relationship between these two aspects of judicial independence is that an in-
dividual judge may enjoy the essential conditions of judicial independence but if 
the court or tribunal over which he or she presides is not independent of the other 
branches of government, in what is essential to its function, he or she cannot be 
said to be an independent tribunal. 
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ess…”.5 It is institutional independence that enables the judiciary to 
fulfil its role as protector of the Constitution.  
In considering changes to the appointment process, I believe we 
must proceed with caution. What is at stake is the relationship between 
the branches of government that form the basic structure of our society.  
II. TWO DEBATES UNDERWAY 
Two very different debates are taking place over judicial independ-
ence. The first one is being conducted by what I call “legal populists” 
and their theme is so-called judicial accountability. While serving as an 
MPP in the Official Opposition, I opposed various attempts by members 
of the legislature to limit or “rein in” the judiciary, such as a proposed 
measure to keep track of sentences made by judges by way of report 
cards.6  
Those legal populists calling for judicial accountability typically 
criticize the courts for treading where legislators bridle. There is an 
insidious logic to this legal populism. The courts are the people’s courts, 
the argument goes, and therefore the people deserve to have justice 
dispensed in a fashion somehow consistent with public opinion. I be-
lieve that this reaction is nothing less than partisan “sour grapes” mas-
querading as an institutional critique. I do not believe that such criticism 
is truly about the institution and how the judges are appointed. I believe 
the concern is about the jurisprudence being rendered and the results of 
cases. That is what is driving legal populism. 
On the other hand, a very different debate is underway that has little 
or no direct connection with this legal populism. Its focus is on how an 
independent judiciary engages with the executive branch of the state. In 
some ways this debate may serve to fend off the legal populists — by 
building public confidence around the independence of the judiciary so 
as to, in my view, expose the legal populist critique. Here are some of 
the questions being raised by this other voice in questioning how judges 
are appointed.  
                                                                                                                                
5
  Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba, supra, note 1, at para. 123, citing a 
passage from the Court’s decision in Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, [1986] 
S.C.J. No. 50. 
6
  Ontario Hansard, April 26, 2001.  
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First, how does the constitutional guarantee of administrative inde-
pendence — within the context of the institutional independence of the 
judiciary — square with the reality that judges are a critical player in the 
administration of justice? The bar, the bench and government are all 
players in the justice system. Government is accountable to the legisla-
ture and the people. The bar does not have constitutional independence. 
The bench does.  
Here is one illustration. The courts in Brampton, Ontario have the 
highest caseload in the country and, from time to time, backlogs arise 
there that need attention. Recently, Brian Lennox C.J. of the Ontario 
Court of Justice and I have agreed to send in more mobile courts, more 
judges, more Crown attorneys and more court workers than ever before. 
I will be held accountable in the House and otherwise to the people for 
how successful or unsuccessful this effort is. But I cannot mandate the 
Chief Justice to send these people into that court.  
The issue is: How is the judiciary going to be accountable for the 
administration of justice, while at the same time preserving the adminis-
trative independence that has been guaranteed by our Constitution as 
articulated in the Valente decision7 and again, most recently in The 
Provincial Judges Reference?8 
How can judicial appointments attract the measure of independence 
befitting the rightly unaccountable branch of the state, while ensuring 
that the executive that appoints the judges is accountable to the legisla-
ture and to the people? The editorial boards of various major newspa-
pers have been pressing lawmakers to look at this issue for some time.9 
The recommendations range from greater transparency, so that there is a 
greater understanding of how the system works, to arguments that bor-
der on the legal populist approach.  
III. DEMOCRATIC REFORM ON THE AGENDA 
It was in the context of the need to build public confidence in the 
appointments system that the Prime Minister announced in December 
                                                                                                                                
7
  R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, [1985] S.C.J. No. 77 [hereinafter “Valente”]. 
8
  Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba, supra, note 1. 
9
  “Judicial Reform Overdue: Once again, let’s consider confirmation hearings for 
judges”, National Post (4 November 1999), A18. 
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2003 that the federal government would “specifically consult the Stand-
ing Committee on Justice and Human Rights on how best to implement 
prior review of appointments of Supreme Court of Canada judges”.10 In 
February 2004, this commitment was repeated in the Action Plan for 
Democratic Reform released by the Martin government.11 I can certainly 
understand the impulse for democratic reform. It is present at the pro-
vincial level as well.12 
In addition to my role as Attorney General, I serve as Ontario’s first 
Minister Responsible for Democratic Renewal. Our government has 
established a Democratic Renewal Secretariat to work toward meaning-
ful improvements in the political system. It is our intention to consult 
extensively on possible innovations in voting, new spending limits for 
political parties and innovative ways to engage youth in the democratic 
process. 
I have been giving a lot of thought to the issue of Supreme Court 
appointments lately. As both Attorney General with constitutional re-
sponsibility for the administration of justice in the province, and Minis-
ter Responsible for Democratic Renewal, I may be uniquely positioned 
to look at all sides of the issue.  
This question assumed an added urgency in the Spring of 2004 with 
two Ontario vacancies to the Supreme Court due to the retirements of 
Justices Iacobucci and Arbour. 
IV. STANDING COMMITTEE HEARINGS 
The Honourable Irwin Cotler, the federal Minister of Justice and At-
torney General of Canada, spoke to the Commons Standing Committee 
on Justice and Human Rights on March 30, 2004. He said that he would 
move forward with making recommendations to the Prime Minister for 
filling the two upcoming vacancies in a way that is “as comprehensive 
as possible in terms of the range of people who are consulted, and as 
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  News Release, available online at <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=1>. 
11
  <http://www.democraticreform.gc.ca/actionplan/actionplan_e.htm>.  
12
  In Ontario see <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/drs/>. For British 
Columbia, see <http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public>. For New Brunswick, visit 
<http://www.gnb.ca/cnb/promos/Leg-Dem/index-e.asp> and for Quebec visit <http://www. 
mce.gouv.qc.ca/srid/reforme_bref_en.htm>. 
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uniformly systematic as possible in terms of the criteria by which candi-
dates are identified”.13 
Mr. Cotler pledged to come back to the committee after those ap-
pointments are made and explain in detail both the process followed, 
and the details of the evaluation that resulted in the nominees. I think 
this is a thoughtful and prudent way to proceed in the short term, and 
will allow for a thoughtful and prudent approach to making long-term 
changes to the appointment process.  
The federal minister also discussed exactly how the nomination 
process works and exactly what protocol has been followed by the fed-
eral Justice Minister. I think this may have been the first time that a 
Parliamentary committee has heard exactly how this works. I imagine 
that some people were surprised at how comprehensive the process is 
right now in terms of the people who are consulted. One of the alterna-
tives the committee will consider is whether or not the formalization of 
that process will fulfil the need to ensure confidence in the appointments 
system — or whether further measures are necessary.  
Mr. Cotler also highlighted a reality that underlies every judicial ap-
pointment — whether federal or provincial — and that is the constitu-
tional framework, as he put it. He reminded everybody that in the 
constitutional framework the authority to appoint rests with the execu-
tive branch of government. That is a constitutional given. That is our 
starting point, he said, because that responsibility cannot be delegated. 
He went on to say that obviously the process can be improved upon, but 
whatever approach is chosen has to take into account the constitutional 
framework.  
As well, I was pleased to see that Mr. Cotler highlighted the need 
for provincial input. He said it was important to consult with provincial 
Chief Justices, provincial bar associations, provincial leaders of the bar 
and other interested provincial bodies. He added that it will be necessary 
for him to consult with the provincial Attorney General of the province 
where the appointment is taking place, because it is the provincial At-
torney General who has the requisite understanding and expertise to 
assess prospective nominees from the region.  
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  <http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/conferences/judiciary/readings/evidence7.doc>. 
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Of course, the fact that these hearings have commenced is largely an 
expression of the Prime Minister’s original pledge to ask the committee 
to examine ways to implement prior Parliamentary review.  
What form will this prior review take? The chair of the Commons 
Justice Committee, MP Derek Lee, has said he senses a very clear con-
sensus in the committee. There is little appetite for an open-style hear-
ing. He added that the door seems to close whenever the option of an 
American-style Senate hearing comes up. I agree with him and with this 
consensus. I want to add my voice to those who support the view that 
this is not the direction that we ought to pursue.  
V. COMPARING U.S. AND CANADIAN APPROACHES 
I am reminded of the experience of the late Justice Felix Frankfurter 
of the Supreme Court of the United States. As a law professor before 
joining the court, Frankfurter argued strenuously for public scrutiny of 
Supreme Court appointments. He wrote: 
It is because the Supreme Court wields the power that it wields, that 
appointment to the Court is a matter of general public concern and not 
merely a question for the profession. In good truth, the Supreme Court is 
the Constitution. …In theory, judges wield the people’s power. Through 
the effective exertion of public opinion, the people should determine to 
whom that power is entrusted.14  
This is the most articulate summation of legal populism that I have 
found. It is the exception to the rule that this is purely partisan sour 
grapes dressed up as an institutional critique.  
When he penned those words, Frankfurter could hardly have imag-
ined that he would be the first to discover what they would come to 
mean in practice. He was nominated to the Supreme Court in 1939 and 
was called before the Senate Judiciary Committee — then a precedent-
setting event. This was the beginning of the Senate’s practice, so famil-
iar today, of questioning Supreme Court nominees in person.  
Frankfurter apparently attended his hearing reluctantly. Before he 
was questioned, he read a prepared statement that amounted to a com-
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  F. Frankfurter, “The Appointment of a Justice”, in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme 
Court, P. Kurland (ed.) (1970), at 211, 216-17. 
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plete conversion from what I have termed the legal populist position. He 
said: 
I should think it improper for a nominee no less than for a member of the 
Court to express his personal views on controversial political issues 
affecting the Court. My attitude and outlook on relevant matters have been 
fully expressed over a period of years and are easily accessible. I should 
think it not only bad taste but inconsistent with the duties of the office for 
which I have been nominated for me to attempt to supplement my past 
record by present declarations.15  
At the hearing, Frankfurter was questioned about such matters as 
possible links to the Communist Party, his friendship with an official of 
the British Labour Party, and his membership on the national committee 
of the American Civil Liberties Union.  
Asked to recall the experience, he later said: “I thought that it would 
be just a little room where we’d sit around. I found that this was Madi-
son Square Garden.”16 
There is a lesson here, as we contemplate reform of the Supreme 
Court of Canada appointment process. We must take care that our good 
intentions do not ultimately lead to the kind of spectacle you would find 
at Madison Square Garden or the Air Canada Centre. 
It may be instructive to contrast the Canadian process with the 
American process in more depth. Here in Canada, under the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867, the federal Parliament has the authority to establish a 
“general court of appeal for Canada”.17 Using this power, the federal 
Parliament established the Supreme Court of Canada in 1875. The stat-
ute that creates and governs the court today is The Supreme Court Act.18 
Supreme Court judges are appointed by the Governor in Council — 
that is, the federal cabinet. Under the legislation, at least three justices 
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  H. Phillips (ed.), Felix Frankfurter Reminisces (1960), at 284. 
16
  Id., at 284. 
17
  Section 101. Section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides that “the Governor 
General”, that is the federal government, “shall appoint the judges of the superior, district and 
county courts in each province”. Section 92(4) of the Constitution Act, 1867 confers on each 
province the power to make laws in relation to “the establishment and tenure of provincial 
offices and the appointment and payment of provincial officers”. Under this provision, the 
province appoints and pays the judges of the inferior courts. In Ontario, this is the Ontario 
Court of Justice. 
18
  R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26. 
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must be from Quebec. Since 1949, a pattern of regional representation 
has been more or less maintained by tradition: three justices from Que-
bec, three from Ontario, two from the western provinces and one from 
the Atlantic provinces. Aside from that, the only other formal qualifica-
tion is that a judge must be a member of one of the provincial bars and 
have a minimum of 10 years experience. Section 5 of the Supreme 
Court Act sets the bar at 10 years — section 6 mandates that at least 
three judges be from Quebec.19 
So in this country there are few legal provisions governing the ap-
pointment of Supreme Court judges. And there appear to be no constitu-
tional conventions that have developed in this area either.  
Under our system, there is no requirement to have appointments 
ratified by the Senate, the House of Commons or a legislative commit-
tee. While confidential consultations are held with the organized bar and 
bench, the appointments take place outside public scrutiny.  
The American system is the polar opposite. It is conducted in full 
public view, but that brings its own problems, as Frankfurter pointed 
out.  
Yale Law Professor Stephen Carter describes the American system 
as the “confirmation mess”.20 The origins of this “mess” go back to the 
framers of the U.S. Constitution. Their outlook was shaped by the dec-
ade preceding the Revolutionary War. As one account puts it, the British 
had advanced “to the most eminent stations men without education and 
of dissolute manners”.21  
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were determined to avoid this 
by putting limits on executive authority. The debates at the time centred 
on whether to vest the power to appoint in the entire legislature, the 
Senate alone, the President alone, or in the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. The Convention of 1787 settled for the latter as a 
compromise. Over the years the Senate has not hesitated to wield its 
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  Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 6. 
20
  See Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning up the Federal Appoint-
ments Process (New York: Basic Books, 1994). 
21
  The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1992), at 41. 
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power. In all, it has refused to confirm some 30 out of 144 Supreme 
Court nominees, although its zeal has diminished over time.22 
Prior to 1929, Senate confirmation hearings were conducted in 
closed session, except on two occasions. Since then, the nomination 
sessions have been public unless closed by majority vote. And since 
1939 nominees have been questioned in person.  
It is widely accepted that the Senate has introduced political and 
ideological, if not blatantly partisan, considerations into the confirma-
tion process. This practice has existed since the first nominees put for-
ward by George Washington. Perhaps the most spectacular example was 
the 1987 rejection of Judge Robert H. Bork. It is still discussed whether 
Bork was actually “borked” — that is, treated unfairly — but no doubt 
the debate was an ideological one turning on his previous rulings and 
views.23  
V. RISKS OF POLITICIZING THE COURT 
While the Canadian process has its faults, few would want to re-
place it with the U.S. approach — as the Commons committee appears 
to have noted. The biggest problem in my view with importing the con-
firmation mess from the United States into Canada is that American-
style hearings — open to the public and broadcast on national TV — 
necessarily create expectations and a mandate for the nominee. The 
nominee articulates answers to all of the litmus test questions asked by 
the senators. The nominee says here is my position on this and on that. 
This creates a mandate for that nominee to be that particular kind of 
judge. It does not promote a constitution that lives and breathes and 
evolves through that judge. That judge is now a conservative judge, a 
liberal judge, a this judge or a that judge. 
This is not how it is done in Canada. Of course, governments of dif-
ferent political stripes have appointed judges. But a direct correlation 
cannot be made between who appointed them and what kind of juris-
prudence they ended up rendering at the end of the day.  
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  Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 
1999), at 28. 
23
  “Bork Wasn’t Borked”, Washington Post (21 May 2001). 
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If the U.S. system were adopted here, the mandate and the expecta-
tions of nominees would come with it. This would strike at the imparti-
ality of judges. Not only that, the judgment of appointees would be 
handcuffed to some extent because they came to the bench with a cer-
tain mandate and there would be expectations for them to fulfil that 
mandate — or at least there would be that perception. This is the prob-
lem with a more transparent system — if transparency focuses on the 
judge as opposed to the process.  
On the other hand, transparency of the process makes sense. Indeed, 
as the Minister Responsible for Democratic Renewal in Ontario, I am 
personally and politically committed to greater transparency in govern-
ment. 
From the public’s vantage point, there are two concerns about the 
appointment process — one around partisanship and the other around 
the quality of nominees. The public needs to know that the process is 
fair, rigorous and exhaustive. A more transparent process could well 
strengthen public confidence in the Court itself.  
On increased transparency of the process, I say, absolutely. But I se-
riously question transparency as to the judges’ views because this cre-
ates expectations and threatens to politicize appointments. I worry about 
what happens to our democracy if the judiciary is forced to become 
politicians with robes on. If judges were in any way to duplicate elected 
branches of the state, we all lose a check and a balance on government 
and the legislature. That is not the case now, but we must prevent this 
from happening.  
In the case of Ell v. Alberta,24 the Supreme Court of Canada specifi-
cally commented that political interference in the appointment process is 
undesirable. The Court said: 
Unquestionably, the perception that appointment to judicial office is 
political in nature undermines public confidence in the administration of 
justice.  
In the Provincial Judges Reference, the Court expressly held that 
there is a constitutional imperative that — to the extent possible — the 
relationship between the judiciary and the other branches of government 
                                                                                                                                
24
  Ell v. Alberta, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 857, at para. 45, [2003] S.C.J. No. 35. 
40  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
should be “depoliticized”.25 The legislature and executive cannot, and 
cannot appear to, exert pressure on the judiciary.  
The institutional independence of the judiciary reflects a deep com-
mitment to the separation of powers between the judiciary and the other 
branches of government. Any reform of the appointment process will 
have to meet the constitutional test of judicial independence.  
Let me add that this does not mean that the door to reform is consti-
tutionally closed. In the same case of Ell v. Alberta,26 the Supreme Court 
also signalled a more deferential approach to possible reform. Alberta 
had brought in new legislation intended to improve the qualifications 
and independence of Alberta’s justices of the peace. Justices of the 
peace who did not meet these criteria were removed from office and 
offered administrative positions. The constitutionality of these provi-
sions was challenged as infringing the constitutional guarantee of judi-
cial independence. 
The Court found otherwise, ruling that “a removal from office that 
is reasonably intended to further the interests that underlie the principle 
of judicial independence is not arbitrary.”27 The Court believed that 
judicial independence should not be interpreted in such a fashion as to 
hinder necessary reforms to improve public confidence.  
I know it is risky to predict what the Court might decide. But I 
would venture to say that this balanced approach will prevail in the 
Supreme Court of Canada if a reform of its own appointment process is 
ever challenged on constitutional grounds.  
VI. THE QUALITY AND CHARACTER OF THE COURT 
Another concern with importing the U.S. system into Canada is that 
it might turn away outstanding candidates. Here I am thinking about 
L’Heureux-Dubé J., the second woman to be appointed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé testified before the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and 
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  Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 131, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 75. 
26
  Ell v. Alberta, supra, note 24, at para. 46. 
27
 Id., at para. 33. 
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Emergency Preparedness on March 30, 2004.28 Her testimony was im-
portant and insightful because she was the only judge who appeared 
before that Committee. In her testimony before the Committee, 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. indicated that she might have declined the nomina-
tion to the Supreme Court if she had been asked to appear before a par-
liamentary committee. 
I believe that a wide open process would change the character of the 
Court. An American-style system would attract applicants who are com-
fortable going before public hearings and answering questions. These 
tend to be more the extroverted types who like to talk at length and lay 
out their beliefs. If nominees had to appear before a committee, I do not 
believe this requirement would necessarily turn aside every single excel-
lent candidate. But, thinking about the Court’s membership today and 
over the last 20 years, it is clear certain judges would never have par-
ticipated in this. American-style hearings would change the character of 
the Court and I feel that is just as important as deterring qualified appli-
cants.  
VII. ALTERNATIVE APPOINTMENT MODELS 
So, if not U.S.-style open hearings, then what?  
One alternative is the creation of an independent non-political 
commission that vets potential nominees and makes recommendations. 
This approach would resemble the way justices have been appointed to 
the Ontario Court of Justice since the Honourable Ian Scott set up the 
process in the late 1980s.29 This is the process, by the way, that a British 
                                                                                                                                
28
 <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoCom/PubDocument.asp?DocumentID=1281895&Language=E>. 
29
  Ontario’s system for appointments to the Ontario Court of Justice goes back to De-
cember 15, 1988, when the then Attorney General, the Honourable Ian Scott, announced in 
the Ontario Legislature the establishment of the Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee 
as a pilot project, and set out its mandate: first, to develop and recommend comprehensive, 
sound and useful criteria for selection of appointments to the judiciary, ensuring that the best 
candidates are considered; and second, to interview applicants selected by it or referred to it 
by the Attorney General and make recommendations. 
On February 28, 1995, the Courts of Justice Act established the committee by legisla-
tion. All appointments to the Ontario Court of Justice must be made by the Attorney General 
from amongst a list of applicants recommended to him by the committee, and chosen in 
accordance with its own process of criteria, policies and procedures. These criteria, policies 
and procedures are publicly available.  
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consultation paper said is “generally cited as a model example”30 of 
independent judicial appointments. The Government of Canada also has 
a series of advisory committees for appointments to federal and provin-
cial superior courts.31 
Looking abroad, South Africa has an advisory body. There, the 
President appoints judges from a list of nominees prepared by a Judicial 
Service Commission. The commission must provide a list with three 
names more than the number of appointments to be made. The President 
may make appointments from the list, and must advise commission, 
with reasons, if any of the nominees are unacceptable and any appoint-
ment remains to be made. 
The commission is chaired by the Chief Justice and composed of 
three judges, the Minister of Justice, four lawyers, one law professor, 
four provincial representatives, four presidential nominees, six Members 
of Parliament — at least three of whom are opposition members — and 
in some cases other judicial and provincial representatives. 
On the other hand, instead of giving advice, an independent com-
mission could make selections that are mandatory. This is how Israel 
does it — although in Canada we would have to work within the consti-
tutional framework whereby it is the executive branch making the ap-
pointment.  
Israel’s Judicial Selection Committee is composed of the Minister of 
Justice as chair, another cabinet minister, two Members of Parliament, 
the Chief Justice and two other justices of the Supreme Court and two 
representatives from the bar. Politicians are in the minority in this sys-
tem. 
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In March 2004, the Canadian Bar Association came forward with a 
proposal for the Government of Canada to consider. The bar association 
suggests creating a Special Advisory Committee to make recommenda-
tions to the government for each Supreme Court vacancy. These com-
mittees would include bench and bar representation, as you might 
expect. What’s new is that each committee would also include four 
Members of Parliament from the Standing Committee on Justice and 
Human Rights.32 
I have one comment on the involvement of elected representatives 
in the selection process. Putting Members of Parliament on an advisory 
committee again creates expectations. Members of Parliament are 
elected with a political mandate. This is their job and they are rightly 
accountable to the people. They will be under enormous pressure to 
perform and report back to their constituents on what happened in the 
committee, assuming of course that it was open to the public in some 
fashion. 
The only way I can see this working without politicizing the process 
would be to maintain confidentiality as the Ontario process does — 
although again, Members of the provincial Parliament are not involved. 
I am thinking of an approach that resembles cabinet confidentiality. 
MPPs or MPs who are in cabinet are elected with a political mandate 
and they go into cabinet and make arguments and know that information 
will remain in the cabinet room. There are rare, but unfortunate, cabinet 
leaks and this fact should make us pause before we rush into a decision 
about having MPs sit on such advisory committees.  
Here is a further point to think about. The present system has led to 
some surprising nominations that, with the passage of time, have been 
heralded as courageous or inspirational. It could be argued that the more 
people involved in the process, the safer appointments are likely to be. 
A review process could become a barrier to bold or creative appoint-
ments, and make it more likely that appointments will be the product of 
brokering.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Parliament is absolutely right to deliberate on this 
matter in the way that it has been. Nothing could be more important than 
getting democratic reform right. I also commend and very much support 
the constitutional framework and the description thereof provided by 
Mr. Cotler that will help guide the deliberations.  
The House of Commons Committee has not heeded the clamour of 
the legal populists. Yet I would encourage those with a scholarly interest 
in the subject not to dismiss legal populism as trivial. The bench and the 
bar take the independence of the judiciary for granted. But this view is 
not necessarily shared and the virtue of it is not necessarily understood 
by everybody. It is the job of elected officials to explain it. It is also the 
job of those who are able to speak to the public — and who are account-
able to the public — to defend judicial independence. 
Whatever the path chosen, reform of the Supreme Court appoint-
ment process must respect the fundamental principle of judicial inde-
pendence. Reform must foster the objectivity, the creativity and the 
integrity that have characterized the past and present Supreme Court of 
Canada. In other words, it must attract and allow for the appointment of 
the best of the best, the most excellent of the excellent. 
Nearly two centuries ago, Lord Brougham said that it was the boast 
of Augustus that he found Rome of brick and left it of marble. I believe 
that we have inherited and we have now a judicial system — an admini-
stration of justice — made of marble. Our challenge is to ensure we 
leave it of gold. 
 
